Philosophising with the greats
International conference
Venue: Corpus Christi College, Oxford
Dates: 28-30 September 2023
In this Workshop we explore current methodological approaches in use for studying, promoting, and applying the ideas of great philosophers of the past to current philosophy. We will hear from a variety of leading philosophers concerning their own approaches as to how they engage with the ancient works.
14:00
14:30
16:00
16:30
18:00
09:30
11:00
11:15
12:45
14:00
15:30
15:45
17:15
17:30
19:00
09:30
11:00
11:15
12:45
14:00
Thursday 28 September - Rainolds Room
Meet and Greet
Chairperson: John Pemberton (Durham University)
Barbara Sattler (Bochum University) Spatial Notions in Early Greek Thought
Coffee / Tea
Chiara Martini (Oxford University) Extension but not Space: Aristotle on Intelligible Matter
Drinks reception open to all sponsored by Edinburgh University Press for Dialogoi. Ancient Philosophy Today.
Friday 29 September - Seminar Room
Chairperson: Susan Brower-Toland (St Louis University)
Richard Neels (Oklahoma State University) Fundamentality and Forms in Plato’s Parmenides
Coffee / Tea
David Lefebvre (Sorbonne University) Power, Potentiality, Powerfulness: Aristotle's Conception of Dunamis and the Neo-aristotelian Ontology of Powers
Lunch
Chairperson: Jeff Brower (Purdue University)
Christian Pfeiffer (University of Toronto) Aristotle on the Senses and Causes of Being in H.2
Coffee / tea
Katja Vogt (Columbia University) Metaphysics Without Essences
Coffee /tea
Ricardo Salles (National Autonomous University of Mexico) Everlasting Recurrence in Stoic Philosophy
Close
Saturday 30 September - Rainolds Room
Chairperson: Lea Cantor (Cambridge University)
Graham Priest (CUNY Graduate Center) The Contradictory Dao
Coffee / Tea
Michael Della Rocca (Yale University) Humeanism in Spinoza and in Hume: Some Pathologies
Lunch
Close
Invited chairpersons
Jeff Brower (Purdue University)
Susan Brower-Toland (St. Louis University)
Lea Cantor (University of Oxford)
Conference organisers
Anna Marmodoro (anna.marmodoro@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)
John Pemberton (john.m.pemberton@durham.ac.uk)
We ask those intending to attend to register by emailing the organisers their name and affiliation. There is no registration fee,
but optional food fees apply:
Coffee break: £6 per day
Lunch fee: £10.50 per day
Please, indicate whether you will have coffee break/lunch and, if so, how many days.
To get on-site college accommodation (subject to availability) at the reduced rate of £65/night for the duration of the conference, click here: https://shorturl.at/ersN4
This conference will be open to all and will be held in person.
The venue is wheelchair accessible. We aim to conform to BPA/SWIP guidelines - please contact the organisers if you would like any further information.
Abstracts
Richard Neels: Fundamentality and Forms in Plato’s Parmenides
Recent scholarship has paid too little attention to the structure of fundamentality at work amongst the Forms in Plato’s Parmenides. In this paper I argue that the Forms in the deductions of Parmenides stand to one another in a rather intricate and unique structure of fundamentality. All conceptual Forms are, in part, dependent on other Forms. However, in part, all Forms are also independent (i.e. they are in part foundational entities). Any one Form is thus partially dependent on the other Forms and partially an independent entity. I label this view Metaphysical Foundherentism and show that it is unique among contemporary schemes of fundamentality.
Christian Pfeiffer: Aristotle on the Senses and Causes of Being in H.2
Aristotle claims that being is said in many ways. Throughout the history of metaphysics, this thesis has been regarded either as a profound insight or as incomprehensible. But what exactly did Aristotle mean by it? Based on an interpretation of Metaphysics H.2, I will argue (1) that it concerns ways of being, not kinds of being; (2) that Aristotle distinguishes between existential and predicative being; (3) that it is not a semantic but a metaphysical claim, concerning the metaphysical explanation of what it is for things to exist; and finally (4) that the background of Aristotle's analysis is Plato's Sophist, where Plato claims that the form of being explains what it is for things to exist.
Ricardo Salles: Stoic everlasting recurrence
In Stoicism, the present cosmos will end in a conflagration. This conflagration will be followed by a cosmogony in which the cosmos will be restored anew. This sequence of destruction and regeneration will happen, and has happened, infinitely many times. In one version of the theory — the version with which this paper is concerned— the cosmos that recurs is the same ‘even down to the smallest details’ (ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων). The identity is one in type. Just as Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz in December 2 of 1805, he will win it again in December 2 of 1805 of the next cosmic cycle. And all else will also be repeated. In this paper, I deal with one specific problem in this theory. Supposing that the present cosmos is indeed type-identical to the next cosmos, how can they really occupy different places in time? In other words, how can the present cosmos be earlier than the next if they are truly type-identical? Evidently, the Problem goes well beyond the topic of everlasting recurrence and the discussion will address a broader metaphysical question. How any two times can be distinct from each other if the events that occupy them are type-identical. Can times, in general, be individuated independently from the events that occupy them?